Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: a Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms by Goldberg, Arthur J.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 3
Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: a Dissenting
View and Recommended Reforms
Arthur J. Goldberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arthur J. Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: a Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 Md. L. Rev. 225 (1984)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/3
Maryland Law Review
VOLUME 43 1984 NUMBER 2
© Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc. 1984
Comment
REGULATION OF HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS: A
DISSENTING VIEW AND RECOMMENDED
REFORMS
THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Advisory. Com-
mittee on Tender Offers was established on February 25, 1983. Under
its charter, the Advisory Committee was to "conduct an extensive exam-
ination of the tender offer process and other techniques for acquiring
control of public issuers," and to recommend those "legislative and/or
regulatory changes" in the existing securities regulation scheme that it
might deem "necessary or appropriate. "2 The Advisory Committee's
final report was presented to the Chairman of the SEC on July 8, 1983. 3
The author of this Comment was a member of the Advisory Com-
mittee but did not agree with many of the views and recommendations
presented in the Report. In order to express my disagreement I pre-
pared a separate statement of my own views and proposals for reform;4
that statement forms the basis of this Comment.
Many persons familiar with securities trading have long expressed
concern about abuses in the tender offer process.' Public concern about
* Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19,528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983).
2. CHARTER OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITrEE
ON TENDER OFFERS, reprinted in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, U.S. SEC,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 122 (separate statement of Arthur J. Goldberg), 137 app. 2,
preamble (1983) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg statement].
3. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, U.S. SEC, REPORT OF RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
4. Goldberg statement, supra note 2, at 122-33.
5. See, e.g., Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687
(1978); Note, Corenco v. Schiavone: The Cash Tender Oferor as Corporate Raider, 26 ME. L.
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those abuses was accentuated by Bendix Corporation's and Martin
Marietta Corporation's acquisition of controlling shares in each other in
a hostile takeover situation.6 That episode was obviously a "distortion"
which did public injury to our capital markets.7
But the problems concerning tender offers transcend that bizarre
occurrence. In the words of the chairman and chief executive officer of
a major company, "Maybe there's something wrong with our system
when . . . companies line up large amounts of money in order to
purchase stock, when it doesn't help build one new factory, buy one
more piece of equipment, or provide even one more job."'
Some of the abuses which have occurred in recent tender offers are
dramatically illustrated by the terms employed in the art or "game" of
tender offers: golden parachutes, poison pills, lock-ups, two-tier systems,
sales of crown jewels, Pac-Man defenses, scorched earth policies, and the
like.9 These terms seem more appropriate to video games than to the
acquisition of capital assets of major companies. They are singularly
inappropriate in characterizing substantial financial and economic mat-
ters involving shareholders and the public. The use of these terms is
symptomatic of the fact that tender offers involve gamesmanship relat-
ing to control of management.
REV. 93, 103-04 (1974); Note, Pivate Litigation Under the Williams Act: Standing To Sue, Elements
ofa Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545, 545-50 (1982); Wayne, The Corporate Raiders, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 18. For more recent commentary noting that some
observers believe that tender offers divert resources from more economically productive uses,
see Williams, Frenzy and Style in the Merger Boom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, § 3, at Ft. For a
brief working definition of tender offers and an explanation of how they work, see Glenn,
Rethinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock Transactions Under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1931, 8 J. CORP. L. 41, 42 (1982).
6. For background information on the Bendix-Martin Marietta drama, see Martin Mar-
ietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 625-26 (D. Md. 1982); Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers. .4 Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 249-50
(1983). See also Masters, Lawyers Debate Best and Worst of Bendix Takeover Maneuvers, Legal
Times of Wash., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Salmans, Tumultuous Takeover Saga Ends: Allied and
Bendix Agree to Merge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
7. According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
"Chairman Paul A. Volcker, of the Federal Reserve, has expressed concern 'about take-overs
distorting banking judgments or the credit markets."' Letter from Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, to John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (February 1, 1983), reprinted in ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 158-60 [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Letter]. But see ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14, 63 (tender transactions do not result in material
distortion of credit markets).
8. Senate Committee letter, supra note 7.
9. A glossary of these and similar terms is provided as an appendix to this article. For a
discussion of the tactics involved, see Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can
Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 339-43
(1983).
226 [VOL. 43:225
REGULATION OF HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS
Mergers, unlike most tender offer situations result in outright ac-
quisition of the assets and operating facilities of a business and most
often are undertaken only with shareholder approval. Tender offers, on
the other hand, frequently involve a contest for control of the manage-
ment of a company in transactions not subject to vote by the sharehold-
ers of either the offeror or target company. Although a few tender offers
may be designed to acquire an entire company, most are designed to
effect a change in management control, and the offeror ordinarily pays a
premium only for enough shares to accomplish the change.
Changes in management may or may not be in the interest of
shareholders of the offeror or the target company. What seems to have
been ignored in the Advisory Committee's Report1 ° is whether such
changes are in the public interest. Yet, the Advisory Committee's man-
date derived in part from a letter sent to the Chairman of the SEC by
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
that letter stated in pertinent part that "the public interest and the Con-
gress would be best served by a broad study of the many issues sur-
rounding tender offers and particularly hostile take-overs, and,
therefore, we encourage the Commission panel to be comprehensive in
both its approach and charter."'"
The Advisory Committee Report made no significant reference to
protection of the public interest, due to a misconception that, aside from
possible antitrust violations, tender offers substantially affect only the
interests of shareholders and not those of the public at large. Further-
more, although a limited determination as to the applicability of anti-
trust laws is made by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act, 2 the resulting protection is inadequate because of the time
limitation imposed by that legislation and the circumscribed nature of
the inquiry."1
10. Supra note 3.
11. Senate Committee letter, supra note 7. The Advisory Committee's mandate also is
derived from its charter. Se CHARTER OF THE SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, repnhzted in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER
OFFERS, U.S. SEC, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 137-39.
12. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. § 1505 & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(h) (1982)).
13. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, certain tender offerors and their targets must file
with the FTC information about their operations and the proposed transaction, in order to
permit review of the potential anti-competitive effect of a successful tender offer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(a), (c)-(d) (1982). There is a waiting period of 15 calendar days after the initial filing
by the offeror, during which the offeror may not purchase shares tendered. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(a), (b)(l) (1982); See 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (1983). The FTC may request additional infor-
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Protection of the public interest is not foreign to the federal securi-
ties laws. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 declared that "transac-
tions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public inter-
est. . . ."" The stock market crash which contributed to the depression
in the 1930s and led to the enactment of the federal securities laws is
proof enough of the public interest involved in appropriate regulation of
the securities markets and the economic necessity of proper regulation.
No evidence was presented to the Advisory Committee and no au-
thoritative study seems to have been made as to whether, in the long
run, tender offers have contributed to corporate viability or profitability
or have benefitted shareholders of the offeror or target company or the
public. Instead, attention has been focused on stock prices which are
based primarily on market perceptions at the time of the tender offer.
Moreover, the market is influenced by many factors, some of which re-
late to stock values and others to the general economy, inflation, interest
rates and the like.
As a country, we justifiably take pride in the fact that shares in our
publicly held companies are widely held and actively traded. As of the
end of 1982, well over 32 million Americans held shares in these compa-
nies." Many Americans hold shares in small numbers, holdings which
nevertheless represent significant investments and, in aggregate, are sub-
stantial. Small shareholders, in the nature of things, do not have access
to competent and readily available independent advice in evaluating
tender offers. Institutional investors, unlike small shareholders, do resort
to professional and expert advice.
The small shareholder, therefore, is at sea in a tender offer situa-
tion. Although some small shareholders may be able to follow market
quotations, those quotations are difficult to interpret and do not furnish
an adequate basis for evaluating a tender offer. A real and unanswered
question is whether a typical non-institutional investor, in a target com-
mation from either or both parties, and has discretion to extend the waiting period for not
more than 10 days after receipt of all requested information and material. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)
(1982); See 16 C.F.R. § 803.20 (1983). The FTC also, in its discretion, may terminate the
waiting period prior to the running of 15 days. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1982); See 16 C.F.R.
§ 803.11 (1983). See generally S. AXINN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE
HART-Scorr-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS Ac-r 7 (1979) ("The Act is designed to
make anticompetitive acquisitions more difficult to accomplish by giving the government the
advantage of some advance opportunity to prepare for and expedite its antitrust attack.").
14. Securities Exchange Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78b (1982)).
15. NEW YORK STOCK EXcHANGE FACT BOOK 49 (B. Wheeler ed. 1983) (in 1981 there
were 32,260 individual owners of shares in public corporations, reflecting a 20% increase in
the years 1975-1980 and an additional 6.8% increase between mid-1980 and mid-1981).
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pany, is better off in the long run if he accepts a tender offer. The same
question also applies to a small shareholder in the offering company. He
likewise suffers a disability in evaluating whether his company, and con-
sequently his shareholding, is better or worse off by the making of a
tender. In both cases the market data are inadequate to answer this
question.
SEC filings do not, under present regulations, enable small share-
holders to determine whether a tender offer is good or bad from their
perspective. Rather, SEC filings are disclosure statements in a form
geared to professional investors. 6 They are as esoteric to a small share-
holder as a Form 1040 is to an average taxpayer - in both cases, profes-
sional advice is virtually a necessity.
It is essential, in my view, that new procedures be created to ensure
that all shareholders of offeror and target companies receive independ-
ent and expert advice regarding the fairness of every tender offer of suffi-
cient size to warrant regulation. And such procedures also are essential
if the public interest is to be safeguarded and confidence in our securities
markets assured.
In light of these considerations and the Advisory Committee's
broad mandate, I make the following recommendations:
1. Tender offers should be submitted to an independent person or
institution, selected by the SEC, for evaluation as to (1) whether the
offer is fair to the shareholders of both the offeror and target company,
and (2) whether, in economic terms, the public interest is protected. 7
In Great Britain, the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers requires an in-
dependent evaluation of a tender offer.'" Testimony before the Advi-
16. See, e.g., SEC Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1983) (requires that a tender
offeror disclose, inter alia, the source of funds used, past transactions between the offeror and
the target company, and any antitrust or other legal problems that might arise upon a suc-
cessful tender offer).
17. An offeror or target company generally solicits professional advice in a tender situa-
tion, but such advice cannot be regarded as truly independent. This advice is basically
designed to assist in the effectuation or resistance of a tender offer. Advisors of this character
are scarcely independent or disinterested.
The proposed evaluation is for the purpose of informing shareholders and not for the
purpose of preventing an unfair offer from proceeding to a shareholder vote. See recommen-
dation number 2, znfra p. 230; recommendation number 5 infra p. 232-33. The scheme pro-
posed here thus is consistent with the purpose of the Williams Act as construed by Justice
White in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1982) (dictum).
18. On British regulation of tender offers, see generally OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING,
MERGERS: A GUIDE TO THE PROCEDURES UNDER THE FAIR TRADING ACT OF 1973 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MERGERS]; DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulatiorv Lessons From
the British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945 (1984). Briefly, the British system of tender offer regulation
is based primarily upon the extralegal City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. The City Code
consists of 14 general principles and 39 rules to give them effect. It is administered by the
1984]
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sory Committee by representatives of the British Panel confirmed the
value of an independent evaluation and also confirmed that such an
evaluation does not impair the operations and effectiveness of the mar-
ket place.
2. The independent evaluation should be performed expeditiously
and made available to the shareholders of both the offeror and the tar-
get companies as well as to the public at large.19
3. "Golden parachutes"2 ° should be prohibited. They have be-
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, a private body established by the British financial industry
in 1968 in order to forestall threatened governmental regulatory activity. The Panel has no
legal authority, but relies upon measures such as adverse publicity and peer pressure to en-
force its Code.
As noted in the text, the City Code provides that once a tender offer has been made
the target company's board must "obtain competent independent advice about the offer and
disclose the substance of that advice to shareholders." Id. at 965. The Panel itself does not
pass upon the merits or disadvantages of offers. Id at 960. It must consent to any partial
offers, but for offers for less than 30% of the target's outstanding stock the Panel's review is
limited. Id. at 962, 985.
In contrast to the Panel, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission reviews tender
offers only if a preliminary investigation has satisfied the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry that the transaction appears to be one covered by the Fair Trading Act of 1973. The
Act, which is primarily concerned with the anticompetitive effects of business combinations,
permits the Secretary of State (Minister) to refer for review what it terms "merger situations
qualifying for investigation." Fair Trading Act, ch. 41, § 64(1), (8) (1973). Qualifying situa-
tions must involve, inter alia, either (1) establishment of "common ownership or common
control" of the parties, or (2) elimination of the activities, or parts of the activities, of either
corporate party. Id. §§ 63(2), 64(1), (8), 65(1).
Because all mergers do not necessarily take the form of share acquisitions in compa-
nies, the [Act] is not concerned with the form of the transaction but with its sub-
stance[,] and is therefore drawn widely enough to include within its scope certain
types of situation[s] not normally thought of as being mergers. In practice, however,
most of the cases dealt with under the [Act] are those which also fall within the
scope of the City Code . ...
MERGERS, supra, at 2.
Once a transaction has been referred to the Commission, the Commission must report
on "whether the creation of [a qualifying] situation operates, or may be expected to operate,
against the public interest." Fair Trading Act § 69(1), (4). Section 84 of the Act sets forth a
number of broad considerations to be taken into account by the Commission in determining
whether a transaction might operate against the public interest, including "the desirability of
maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of industry and employment in the
United Kingdom." Id. § 84(d).
For a discussion of what factors may influence a recommendation by the Director
General of Fair Trading that a case be referred to the Commission for review, see MERGERS,
supra, at 13-18. For reference to some of the procedural provisions of the Act pertaining to
review by the Commission, see nfra note 29.
19. Cf. DeMott, supra note 18, at 965 (rule 4 of the City Code requires that the substance
of the independent advice obtained by the target company be disclosed to target
shareholders).
20. See appendix, infra, p. 237, for a definition of this term. See also Prentice, supra note 9,
at 341.
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come a scandal and a discredit to sound fiscal corporate governance. 2 1
By and large, corporate executives of listed companies are well paid and
receive substantial fringe benefits. I have no quarrel with this, when
deserved. A laborer, whether white or blue collar, is worthy of his hire.
Golden parachutes, however, typically provide for several years' com-
pensation to be paid to managers of a target company in anticipation of
a tender offer, and are designed either to frustrate such an offer or to
"feather the nest" of corporate executives."2 Further, golden parachutes
are creating great cynicism among shareholders and the public about
the integrity of our corporate system.2 3
Assertions that golden parachutes are justified by the business judg-
ment rule are without foundation because they are based upon a mis-
conception of the rule. The business judgment rule was designed to
safeguard not the personal interests of managers but rather the good
faith judgment of managers as to what is in the best interests of the
corporation. Managerial judgment must and should not be affected or
tainted by a conflict of interest. Simply put, the business judgment rule
is fashioned to permit latitude to managers of corporations in the ordi-
nary good faith conduct of business affairs in the interest of the corpora-
tion, where there is no self-dealing or other conflict of interest
involved.2 4
21. See generally Riger, On Colden Parachutes - Ripcords or R'poji? Some Comments on Special
Termination Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15, 25-33 (1982) (golden parachutes are gifts to execu-
tives at a corporation's expense and amount to a waste of the corporation's resources); Lewin,
Business and the Law Using "olden Parachutes," N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,1982, at D2, col. 1. But cf.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39-41. In recognition of the fact that
golden parachute arrangements may create a public perception of self-dealing or other
breach of fiduciary duties by management, the Advisory Committee took the position that
directors should be barred from entering into such an arrangement while a tender offer is in
effect. When golden parachutes are adopted prior to a tender offer, however, the Advisory
Committee merely would require that the agreement be subject to (1) disclosure (of terms and
parties) in annual proxy statements, and (2) an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote at
each annual meeting. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39-41.
22. Some commentators have questioned whether golden parachutes in fact deter tender
offers. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 9, at 341 n.35. The Advisory Committee took the position
that they do not, because "they are a small fraction of an acquisition price." ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39-40.
23. The Advisory Committee essentially conceded this point. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 40.
24. See generally Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg, Thoughts]; Steinberg, Application of the Business Judgment
Rule and RelatedJudicial Principles - Reftections From a Corporate Accountability Perspective, 56 NO-
TRE DAME LAW. 903, 904-07 (1981). But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F.
Supp. 623, 633-34 (D. Md. 1982); DeMott, Pac-Man Tender Ofers, 1983 DUKE L.J. 116,
128-29; f. Note, Tender Ofr Defensive Tactics and The Business Judgement Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 621, 649-58 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tender Tactics] (the business judgment rule
should be applied to target management responses to hostile tender offers, but there should be
19841
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4. The sale of crown jewels2 5 during a tender offer should be pro-
hibited. Such sales are designed to frustrate a tender offer by making
the target company less desirable because of the sale of some of its best
assets. This is not to say that a corporation should be prevented from
conducting its ordinary business during a tender offer, but rather that it
should be prevented from disposing of significant assets as a defensive
tactic to resist a tender offer. The same prohibition should be applied to
the scorched earth tactic, the poison pill device, and the sheer absurdity
of the Pac-Man defense,2 6 best illustrated by the Bendix-Martin Mari-
etta fiasco.27
5. There should be a freeze period during a tender situation, with
respect to both offensive and defensive maneuvers. Adequate time
should be allowed so that competing offers can be made. The time pe-
riod selected should be sufficient to permit competing tender offers and
to allow a more adequate determination of possible anti-trust implica-
tions to be made by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission than now is possible under the limited waiting period pre-
scribed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. 28 British law permits a freeze for
up to nine months.29 A reasonable mandatory freeze period, it seems to
no presumption of good faith if it is shown that the directors are likely to be replaced after a
successful tender offer). The Advisory Committee took the position that "the business judg-
ment rule should be the principal governor of decisions made by corporate management,
including decisions that may alter the likelihood of a takeover." ADVISORY COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 34.
25. See appendix, infra, p. 237 for a definition of this term.
26. See appendix, bnfi-a, p. 237 for a definition of this term; see also Prentice, supra note 9, at
342-43. For some of the problems associated with the Pac-Man defense, see Block & Miller,
The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 44,
64-66 (1983). See generally DeMott, supra note 24 (legal problems arising from use of the
defense may not be amenable to solution under traditional legal principles). But see ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 42-45 (Pac-Man defense should not be restricted
except where a bidder has made a cash tender offer for 100% of the target; sales of corporate
assets to third parties should be permitted subject only to the business judgment rule).
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; cf. DeMott, supra note 18, at 965. DeMott
notes that once a tender offer has been made or appears imminent, the British City Code
prohibits the target board from taking specified actions without shareholder ap-
proval. The prohibited actions include issuing authorized but previously unissued
shares; granting options on unissued shares; issuing convertible securities; agreeing
to sell or acquire assets in any material amount; or entering into contracts outside
the ordinary course of business, unless any of these transactions are conducted pur-
suant to a previously incurred contractual obligation, itself a circumstance subject
to Panel review.
Id.; cf. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 255, 317-18, 328-34 (recommending a similar referendum
requirement for U.S. corporations, with specific comparison to the City Code).
28. For a discussion of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, see supra notes 12-13.
29. Under British law, a tender offer which meets certain criteria may be referred to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission for review of possible anticompetitive effects. Fair
Trading Act, ch. 41, §§ 64-68 (1973), amended by Merger References (Increase in Value of
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me, would be 120 days. Competing tender offers should be permitted
during the first thirty days. After all competing tender offers are made,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should be
afforded a sixty-day period to discharge adequately their responsibilities
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.3 0 Significantly, this sixty-day period
also would give the independent person or institution an adequate op-
portunity to evaluate the various tender offers in terms of fairness to
shareholders and the public. Following the expiration of this sixty-day
period, a thirty-day period should be provided to submit the various
tender offers, the views of the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission, and the independent evaluation to the shareholders
on both sides for their approval or rejection of a tender offer.3 '
6. Partial3" and two-tier 33 tender offers generally should be pro-
hibited. 34 Under our system of corporate governance, changes in con-
Assets) Order 1980, Stat. Inst. 1980 No. 373. Review normally must be completed within a
specified period not longer than six months, but may be extended once by up to an additional
three months if the Secretary of State (Minister) for Trade and Industry is satisfied that there
are "special reasons" to do so. Id. § 70. The Minister may order that the tender offer not be
consummated, that other activities be carried on or not carried on, or that assets be safe-
guarded while a transaction is under review by the Commission; in general, the Minister may
make orders with respect to "any action[s] which might prejudice the reference or impede the
taking of any [remedial] action. . . which may be warranted by the Commissioner's report"
when it is received. Id. § 74(1), (2). Usually, however, the parties involved are asked to give
voluntary assurances that they will refrain from taking prejudicial actions during the period
of review. See MERGERS, supra note 18, at 5, 12.
For critical comments on the review of takeover bids by the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission, and an example of a recent hostile bid the review of which took eight months,
see Ingrassia, Hostile Takeovers Are All the Rage in UK as Civility Declines, Wall St. J., Mar. 16,
1984, at 1, col. 1. For information about the statutory review framework within which the
Commission reviews bids, see supra note 18.
30. See supra notes 12, 13.
31. Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 255-56, 317-18, 322-34 (recommending that hostile
tender offers be required to be kept open for six months and that shareholders be required to
vote on certain defensive actions taken in response to hostile tender offers, and discussing the
effects of such requirements on the tender offer process).
32. Partial offers are tender offers for some percentage that is less than 100% of the target
company's shares.
33. See appendix, infra p. 238, for a definition of this term; see also Comment, The Front-End
Loaded, Two-Tered Tender Offer, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 811, 812 (1983).
34. Cf. DeMott, supra note 18, at 960-62 (under the British City Code, partial offers are
discouraged by (1) providing that any party who accumulates 30% or more of a company's
voting shares must make a cash offer for all remaining shares at the highest price paid by that
party for those shares within the preceding year, and (2) requiring the Panel's consent for any
partial bid). But cf. Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (any tender
offer is coercive to some degree yet Congress has chosen not to outlaw tender offers but rather
to regulate them); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 24-26. While the Re-
port noted that there are "coercive elements" in partial and two-tier tender offers, and that
such offers hold "potential . . . for abusive tactics and practices," id. at 25, disagreement
between Advisory Committee members who strongly favored permitting such offers and those
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trol by and large should be accomplished through proxy solicitations
and pursuant to the democratic vote of shareholders of the offeror and
target companies. Tender offers should not be a contest between com-
peting persons or groups to acquire control of management. A partial
tender offer leaves shareholders who, for one reason or another, do not
tender to the mercy of the market which often declines after the partial
offer is consummated.
In some unusual circumstances economic and corporate conditions
may justify a partial tender offer. In such situations, the offeror seeking
to make a partial tender offer should bear the burden of satisfying the
SEC, under appropriate and specific regulations, that a partial tender
offer is justified.
7. An acquisition of shares in a company resulting in ownership of
fifteen percent or more of its outstanding securities should be required to
make a tender offer for all shares.3 5 SEC regulations should define the
circumstances for granting appropriate "grandfather" exemptions and
also should give consideration to the owner of a private company who is
left with more than fifteen percent of the shares after the company goes
public.
8. As I have noted, before a tender offer is made it should be ap-
proved by shareholders of the offeror.36 Before it is accepted or rejected,
it should be approved by a vote of shareholders of the target company.
This requirement is simply an application of corporate democracy. Af-
ter all, shareholders -own corporations; management does not. Share-
holders risk their capital and consequently are entitled to make the
ultimate decision on matters directly affecting the future of the offeror
and target companies.
Those who would advocate an advisory vote of shareholders in this
context are mistaken. Advisory votes would be inadequate to protect
vital shareholders' interests precisely because they would not bind man-
agement. Rather, there should be definitive and binding votes of the
shareholders of both the offeror and target companies.3 7
who would have prohibited them resulted in Recommendation 16, which merely urged the
establishment of a longer minimum offering period as a "regulatory disincentive" to making
such offers.
35. Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 317 (20% beneficial ownership should trigger require-
ment of a tender offer for hostile acquisitions of more than 5% of shares); ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23 (recommending that no person be allowed to acquire a
resulting ownership of more than 20% of a company's voting shares unless such purchases are
made either directly from the issuing company or pursuant to a tender offer).
36. See supra text accompanying note 31.
37. See Nordhous, The Vanity of the Takeover Game, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, § 3 (Business),
at 3, col. 1 (approval of bidder's shareholders should be required). Cf. Lowenstein, supra note
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9. Supermajority provisions in charters and by-laws of corpora-
tions should be prohibited. 38 These provisions require votes by substan-
tially more than simple majorities of shareholders to approve or defeat
takeovers. Their use is a recent development in defensive strategy which
is contrary to corporate democracy. Like our political institutions, cor-
porate democracy is based on the principle that in a democracy the ma-
jority prevails. While I do not favor a federal corporations act,
prohibition of these provisions is consistent with federal regulations
designed to correct abuses in corporate governance and securities
regulation.
The reforms I suggest might well be accomplished by revision or
imaginative application of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 39 or by adoption and enforcement by the stock exchange of
effective self-regulatory rules.' If after a detailed legal analysis it ap-
6, at 255, 317-18, 328-34 (would require approval by shareholders for certain defensive ac-
tions that would result in "structural changes" to the target corporation, defined as "actions
likely to affect significantly the target's business, assets, financial condition or capital struc-
ture, or the voting rights of its shareholders" even if a tender offer were to be defeated). The
British City Code requires approval by the target's shareholders for certain defensive maneu-
vers that might frustrate a pending or imminent offer. DeMott, supra note 18, at 965. But see
ADVISORY COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 33 (there should be no federal regulation
regarding approval of a tender offer by shareholders of a bidder company); cf. d. at 37-39
(certain specified defensive policies, provisions, and agreements should be subject to (non-
binding) advisory shareholder vote).
38. Cf. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 34-38 (federal legislation and/or
regulations should be adopted to prohibit use of charter and by-law provisions that erect high
barriers to change of corporate control; to the extent that supermajority provisions are per-
mitted they ought to be disclosed to shareholders and subject to (nonbinding) advisory share-
holder vote); Friedenberg,Jaws III: The Impropriet of Shark-Repellent Amendments As A Takeover
Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32, 42-44, 67-92 (1982) (supermajority provisions, like other
shark-repellent amendments, should be banned unless there is some compelling reason for
them; although supermajority provisions may protect minority shareholders from socially un-
desirable freezouts, they may prevent desirable ones and permit "tyranny of the minority").
Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments.: Structural Limitations On the Enabling Concept,
34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982) (the possibility of successful tender offers without the consent of
management is a necessary control on the performance of management; supermajority provi-
sions should have to be adopted by the same supermajority that they require).
39. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 336, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1981). But
see, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1983); Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628-30 (D. Md. 1982) (dictum); Prentice, supra note 9, at
351-58; Note, Tender Tactics, supra note 24, at 629-39. See generally Note, Lock-Up Options.-
Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068 (1983) (Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co. was wrongly decided, and state law should be the source of protection for target
shareholders).
40. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1982) (In order to be registered by the SEC as a national
securities exchange, the self-regulatory rules of the exchange must be "designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of
trade, . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest. ... ); Silver v. New
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pears that further legislation is necessary, however, the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has indicated that it is
willing to consider appropriate legislation.4 '
Abuses in the tender situation are substantial, serious, and continu-
ing. They cannot be treated with bandaids, nor can they be swept
under the rug. The abuses cast a shadow on our system of corporate
accountability and governance. All of us who believe in the free market
should be conscious of a simple fact: As long as the market is responsive
to both shareholders and the public it will, by and large, be free; if the
market is not responsive, it will be subject to legislative restraints far
greater than the reforms I propose.
York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963) (only those exchange self-regulations that
fall within the scope of, and further the purposes of, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will
be excused when challenged as unreasonable restraints of trade under the antitrust laws).
41. The Senate Committee Letter, supra note 7, gives ample evidence of such willingness.
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The most prized asset of a
corporation, i.e. that which makes it
an attractive takeover target. One
defensive tactic against a hostile
tender offer is to sell this asset to
another party, thereby removing the
asset that the unfriendly bidder was
hoping to acquire. This may cause
withdrawal of the offer without the
purchase of any target shares.
A generous severance package that
protects certain key executives if
control of their company changes.
An arrangement, made in connection
with the proposed acquisition of a
publicly held business, that gives the
proposed acquiror an advantage in
acquiring the subject company over
other potential acquirors. Lock-ups
may take the form of stock purchase
agreements for treasury or unissued
shares, options to purchase treasury or
unissued shares, options to buy certain
assets (see "Crown Jewel"), merger
agreements, agreements providing
liquidated damages for failure to
consummate an acquisition, options
and stock purchase agreements
between a "white knight" and
principal shareholders, and similar
arrangements.
A tender offer by the subject company









Efforts by the directors of the subject
company to sell off the company's
assets, or failing this, to destroy the
character of the company. Sale of a
crown jewel may be part of a scorched
earth defense. The aim, of course, is
to cause the offeror to lose interest in
the target or to deprive the offeror of
the fruits of a successful tender offer.
A two-step acquisition technique in
which the first step (front end) is a
cash tender offer and the second step
(back end) frequently is a merger in
which remaining shareholders of the
subject company may receive
securities of the bidder valued below
the consideration offered in the first
step. Despite the reduced
consideration offered, the merger is
certain to be approved because the
bidder will vote its controlling shares
in favor of the merger.
Any provision in an agreement or
charter which will mature upon a
change of control to cause immediate
problems for the acquirer, such as
issuance of a class of securities of the
target company convertible upon a
change in control into the common
stock of the acquiring entity.
The purchase of a substantial block of
the subject company's securities by an
unfriendly suitor, with the primary
purpose of coercing the subject
company into repurchasing the stock
at a premium over the amount paid
by the suitor.
Any amendment to a potential subject
company's charter or by-laws that has
been devised to discourage unsolicited
approaches from bidders, such as
requirement of "supermajority"
shareholder approval of mergers.
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White Knight: A party sought out by the subject
company to make a competing offer-
either a tender offer or an offer of
merger-or to purchase and hold
shares in the subject company as a
party friendly to that company's
management.
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